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PREFACE.
In writing this thesis I have endeavored, as far as
possible, to gather my material from the original sourceq
both for the historical and the legal portion of the work
This has oecasionaly bjen. impossible or inexpedient.
In such cases I have been driven to the secondary author-
ities, and have consulted standard works of history, and
text books on the law involved in the ease.
It was at first my purpose to study the sequence
features more thoroughly and in detail ; but the work
has already projected itself many pages beyond my ex-
peetations. For myself, at least, this research has had
an interest and fascination which arouses a purpose to
continueat a future day, this most interesting of stud-
ios. E.F.S.
Cornell University,
Ithaca, N, Y.
May, 1894.
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I.UTOTICT O , .
In the history of trials, aim from o)t t he dr, aal
dust pages of law re )orts, tr e re are occasifflal flash-
es of intellect an'"' wit, i-,ursts of iorensic eloqaelnice
an& oratory, that. cause evexn the word-a-Fay law'e1 to
pause, and thrill with admairation. In all the history
o2 our law there are but few such causes. The case
which surpasses all others, and has not in English Juris-
prdence had an equal, since the trial of ,Wzrren Yastings,
is that of' Dartmouth Colleg-e. It involved a vital
principle of constitutional law, and the prestige of
sucl names as "-son, Webster, Story, and :a-'B.all have
made it a landmark among trials.
71or more than half a century the case slumbered in
the time-stained parses of the United .tartes Law Reports.
In the subsequent cases which arose, as the sequence of
the doctrine, there are occasional references to
4 Wheaton, citing the rule there established as law.
These are mere sparks of lir ht scatteredx here and there,
which show that the case is not entirely lost in obliv-
ion ; but they are few and far apart. The cloua that
2hmng over a dark spot remained unbroken, and the secrets
of a great case sliumbered in faded letters,and in musty
raniisripts.
In 1879 r. Jonh M. Shirley publishe,. a volume de-
nominated 'The College Causes". It contained a report
of the suits In which the little New Hampshire college
was involved, some of the personal correspondence of the
principal participants in the case, and valuable cOl-
lections of well-nigh forgotten mterial. The work
has been criticised as bungling, and unsystematic.
This Is d(mbtless true. The anthor boggles and stumbles
often ; but he was working in the dark, and in an unex-
plored territory.
When properly sifted and arranged, his work throws
a flood of li.,ht on a heretofore dark spot, and the
Dartmouth Colle Case is made luminous by a burst of
new sunshine. e has rescued from the limbo of histori-
cal rubbish a most faseinting incident, to which is ad-
ded the macnet lin and 'attra'.tiveness of' pe.rsonal and
political history. From the publication of this book,
the Dartmouth Col leze Case has sudIdenly sprung into
prominence. No life of Webster or of Jeremiah Mason
is complete without a special chapter on this now wonder-
3ful case. The law periodicals, and the magazines teerr
with accounts of it. Staid and sedate judges review
the case, accept a long settled precedent, or condemn
with mild praise. In ny brief research I have s'ound
articles both praising and condemning the final decision.
There are essays and conentarios on the case in the
Legl Gazette, Amer.ican Law Review, American Bar Associa-
tion, Harvard Law Review, aria Albany Law Journal. These
articles have all had their rise in the past ten or
twelve years.
The cause arose in the bitterness of a vli'gious
controversy. It was fostered by sectarianism for a
generation ; anrx was handed from father to son, and from
master to pupil. Its sponsor on the one hand was Liber-
alism, and on the other Conservatism. It was Jacobin-
ism against the Church. It easily drifted into poli-
ties, ant ederalismi and Democracy faced each other on
a new issue. A fierce political campaign,Fan ephemeral
rise of the triumphant Democrats, an unsumrnry dismissal
of some college officials, and the affair was brought
before the New J-arpshire court for adjudi0at ion. Let
us now lookbriefly into the details of the origin of
this case.
4CHAPTER I.
ORIGIN OF TYE CASE.
In tlh early days of Dartmouth College, Mr. Eleazer
Wheelock, the founder o- the college, had rmuch religious
controversy with Dr. Bellamy of Coiuiecticut, who was like
himself a graduate of Yale. Wheelock was a Presbyteolsan
and a liberal. bellamy was a Congregationalist and
strictly orthodox. By t he charter the college was free
from any religious discrimination. But by will Wheelock
provided that his son should succeed him as president
of Dartmouth College.
In 1793 Judge 4iles, a pupil of Bellamy, became a
trustee of the college, and h an John Wheelock repre-
sented the opposite views which they had respectively
inherited from tutor and father. They were f1ormed
for mutual hostility, ana the contest began Some twelve
years before it reached the publi. The trustees and
presiLdent were then all Federalists, and there was no
o ifierence either of' a political, or of a religious
nature. The trouble arose from a resistance of a minOri-
5ty of the trustees to what they termed the Family Dynasty
Wheelock nintained his aseendency until 1809, when his
enemies obtained a majority in the board of trustees,
and thereafter admitted no friend of the president to
the government, and used every effort to subdue the
dominant dynasty.
At thds period the Federalists were the ruling party
in New Hampshire, and the Congregationalists formed the
state church. The Congregational ministers were firm
Federalists, and most of their parishioners were of the
same party. Dartmouth College was therefore one of the
Federal and Congregational strongholds. Some -year- of
hopeless and bitter confliot ensued. The Wheel'ock party
finally in 1815 br ought thelr grievances before the
public in an elaborate p'amphlet. This led to a rejoin-
der, and a war of pmphlets ensued, creating a great
sensation and profound interest. Wheelock now contem-
plated legal prooeedings. The president, therefore,
wont to Mr. Webster and consulted him professionally,
paid him a fee, and obtained a promise of future services.
About the t ime of the consultation Wheelock sent a memori-
al to the legislature charging the trustees with misap-
6plication of trie funds, and various breaches of tr.ist,
religious intolerance, and a violation of the olmrter
in their attacks upon the presidential office, and prayed
for a comittee of investi ;ation. The trustees met him
boldly and offered stury resistance, denying all the
chart;es, and especially that off reliiou3 intolerance
but the cortnittee was.oiven by the vote of a large ,Mjori--
ty. When W-heelock heard that the coinittee had been
voted and was to have a hearing, he wrote to U'r.Webster
and asked him to appear before them. But Mr.Webster
did not come, and Wheelock went on without him. Webster
was much criticised for his i'ailure to appear before the
coranittee, but excused ijmuelf with the reply;, that he
did not regwrd a surinons to appear beCore a legislative
corrmittee a professional call, and that he was by no
means sure that the president was in the ritjt.
Mowever, the truth seems to be that most of Mr.Web-
ster's personal and political friends were either trus-
tees themselves, or were Closely ai8:ociated with him in
the control of the Federal party. Dun-ing the interval
between the consult at ion wi th Wheelock and the coinnittee
hearing, these friends and leaders saw Mor. Webster, and
7pointed out to him that he must not desert them, as this
college controversy was rapidly developing into a party
question. Mr. Webster was accordingly convinced, and
left Vheelock in the lurch making, as has been seen, a
very unsatisfactory explanation of his concuct. He was
thereafter irrevocably enga .ed on the side of the trus-
tees, and in him they had won their most powerful ally.
But events took a sharp turn now and moved wi th
spirit. Without heeding the advice of their eminent
counsel, Ir. Jeremiah liason, the trustees at once re-
moved Wheelock from the presidency, and appointed in his
place Rev. Francis Brown, At such defiance of the
legislative committee the spark of" popular excitement
burst into a blaze.of wrath, and the whole question
was at once thrown into politics.
As Mr. Mason had foreseen, when he had warned the
trustees against hasty action, all members of every oth-
er sect except the Congramtionalists and cll the other
liberal element were united against the trustees, and
therelfore against the Federalists. Wheelock, who was a
Federalist, went over to the opposition taking his sup-
porters with him. When the election came on, Mr.Plumer,
8the Democratic candidate, was elected governor, and
with him a Democratic legislature. The position of
the trustees was now precarious. Efforts were mde to
sooth the now rarpant Demcorats. It was noised about
that a ncv college was to be foumded, but the struggle
was in vain. The 7,overnor in his message to the legis-
lature declared against the trustees, and in June the
legislature passed an act to reorganize the college, and
virtually to place it within the control of the state.
Both boards of trustees assembled. The old board
turned out Judge Woodward, their sec1etary, who was a
friend of Wheelock, and secretary also of the new board.
He resolved to fight having received money to carry it
on from a friend. President Brown refused to obey the
surnons of the new trustees, who expelled the old board
by resolution. Thereupon the old board brought sAit
against Woodward for the college seal and other property,
and the case came on for trial in M,[ay, 1817. The writ
was sued out on Februray 8 and the declaration was trover
ir. M[ason and .Tudge Smith appeared for the college, while
George Sullivan and Ichabod Bartlett for Woodward and the
state board. The case was argued, and went over to the
9September term of the same year, wi-ig MNason and Smith
were joined by Mr. Webster.)
(1) Dartmouth College Causes, by Shirley. Curtis'
Life of Webster. Lodge's Life of Webster.
Private Correspondenee of Webster by Tletcher
Webster.
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CHAPTER I I.
THE TECHNIQUE OF THE CASE.
In the "College Causes" Mr. Shirley enumerates some
five distinct cases that were before tke courts during
this rather prolonged ccntroversy. Four of these were
to test the validity of the act of the New Hampshire
legislature of June, 1816,-- "to amend the charter, and
enlarge and improve the corporation of Dartmouth College",
and the supplementary act of December 18 and 26 of the
same year.
The principal changes made in the charter by the
acts of the New Hampshire legislature on June 27, 1816
and December 16 and 26 of the same year were :
(1) The name is changed to "The Trustees of Dart-
mouth University."
(2) The nunber of trustees is increased from twelve
to twenty-one, a majority of whom shatll constitute a
quorum. The nine new trustees are to be appointed by
the governor and his counsel. 1
(I) The act of Pecember 16 repealed that part of
the act of June 27 which mde a majority of the
trustees necessary to constitute a quoru, and
made nine trustees a quoru instead.
11
(3) The trustees shall have power to organize col-
leges in the university, and to establish an institute
and elect fellows and members thereof.
(4) A board of overseers, twenty-five in number,
is created ; the ,-!abers to be appointed by the governor
an& counsel. The overseers are to have power to dis-
approve and negative votes of the trustees relative to
the appointment and removal of the president, professors,
and officers ; relative to salaries ; and also relative
to the establishment of colle6es and professorahips,
and othe erection of new college buildings.
(5) IEach of the two boards of trustees md over-
seers shall have power to suspend and remove any member
of their respective boards.
Dr. Eleazer Wheelock applied to the crown for a
charter, and the king in 1769, granted the eharter of
Dartmouth eollere. The chartcr of the above date recites
in substance as follows
That there shall be a college erected in New H-amp-
shire, Dartmouth %ollege by name for the education of
Incian and English youth ; and that there shall be in
said college "from henceforth and forever" a body corpoF-
12
ate and politic, consisting of trustees of said college,
*the whole number of said trustees consisting, and here-
after forever to consist of twelve and no more.' The
charter expresses the intent thrat the corporation shall
have perpetual succession and continuance forever. It
also appoints Dr. Wheelock and eleven other persons as
trustees. From the preamble it is to be presumed that
not less than six of the eleven were the samne persons
who had already been named as trustees by Dr. Wheelook
in his will. Seven trustees constitute a quorum. The
board of trustees fill vacancies in their own number.
The usual corporate privileges and powers are conferred
upon the trustees and their successors forever. The
charter styles Dr. Woodward the "Founder of the College*,
and appoints him president.
The law amending the charter of Dartmouth College
was passed in December, 1817. At the time of its pas-
sage in the New Hampshire legislature, a protest was
entered upon the records of the house by those who had
opposed it, upon the ground that the Charter was a con-
tract, and therefore beyond the reach of legislative
control. This is said to be the first instance on rec-
13
ord where the "contract theory" in rejard to a corporate
franchise was ever invoked under our constitution, and
then only as a matter of justice, and not of constitu-
tional right.
The different suits in which the college was in-
volved during this extended litiration were
(1) Trustees of DJartmouth College v. Will ism I.
Woodward. Action,-- trespass on the case for converting
etc. divers books anu records.
(2) IHatch v, Lang. Action,-- in eject~..ent for
.;3,000. This wa6 al so carried to the Supreme Court of
the United States.
(6) Pierce v. Gilbert. Action,-- ojectment ; dama-
ges claimed 02,000.
(4) arsh v. Allen, executor of John Wheelock.
Action,-- ejectment ; daina-es claimed ,00.
(5) Allen v. Dartmouth College. Action,-- assumpsit
, ,O00 claimed for services as president o the college.
We r.e concerned in this article only with trio case of'
Trustees of iartrnouth College v. V'oodward, reported
in the lower court in I :ew H phr eors l n
in the United States court in 4 Wheaton. The quest ion
14
as presented in this case to the court was :
Did the Constitution under the clause, "No state
shall . . . .. pass any . . . . law irparing the obli-
gation of contract', establish the doctrine that every
charter granted by the state legislature is a contract,
and as such irrevocable by act of the legislature ?
The action was comr.enced at the court of common
please, Grafton County, February term, 1817. The wri t
was sued out on the 8th and served on the 10th of the
same month. The d eclaration was trover for the books
of record purporting to contain the records of all the
doings and proceedings of the trustees of Dartmouth Col-
lege from the organization of the corporation until the
7th of October, 1816 of the value of $,5,000,-- the origi-
nal letters patent constitutinfg the college, of the value
of l0,000,-- the comnon seal, of the value of $1,000,--
and four volumes or books of accounts purporting to
contain the charges and accounts in favor of the collegef
of the value of l0,000. The conversion is alleged to
have been ode on the 7th of October, 1816. Plaintiff's
damages are laict at 50,00O.
Note.-- In the act of December 26, 1816, a fine of
$500 was imposed upon any rran 'who shall di-
15
We now turn to the managemmt and argumnt of the
case before the New Hampshire tribunal.
rectly or indlirectly wilfully impede or hinder
any officer or officers . . . in the free and en-
tire discharge of tile autie8 of tuieir respective
offices.
16
CHAPTER III.
IN THE NEW HAMPSHIRE COURT.
In a previous chapter it was shown, that in the
first argument of the case the interests of the college
were left with Jeremiah Mason and Judge Smith, assisted
later by Mr. Webster, while Mr. Woodward's attorneys
were Sullivan and Bartlett. The sensation of the second
trial was Mr. Webster's speech,-- a brilliant rhetorical
effort,-- which was later used, in modified form, so ef
fectively before the Supreme Court of the United States.
The argument of the case,and the opinion of Judge
Richardson is given in 1 New Hampshire, ill. The opinion
is vigorous and hostile, and is against the college. It
holds that*--
(1) The corporation of Dartmouth College is a public
corporation. (The opposite of this is set forth in the
court above by Chief-Justice Marshall.)
(2) An act of the legislature, adding new members
to the corporation, without the consent of the old cor-
poration, is not repugnant to the constitution of this
state.
charter of the king, creating the corpora-T lie
17
tion of Dartmouth College, is not a contract within the
meaning of that clause of the constitution of the United
States which prohibits states from passing laws impair-
ing the obligation of contracts.
In proceeding to the opinion the court states, that
it has witnessed a display of learning, talent, and
eloquence that is highly complinentary to the legal pro-
fession of the state. That the failure of the plain-
tiff's counsel to convince the bench of the correctness
of their position is not owing to any want of diligence
in research, or ingenuity in reasoning ; but to a want
of solid and substantial grounds on which to rest their
arguments.
The court then proceeds to point out', that the
college is a public corporation, since its franchises
were exercised for public purposes, Darmouth College
is a public corporation in the same manner in which a
bank would be a corporation, if the state should purchase
all the shares of the company. So also if the legisla-
ture should incorporate a number of individuals for the
purpose of making a canal, and should reserve all the
profit arising from it to the state, even though all the
18
fur 1s might be given to the corporation by individuals,
it would in fact be a public corporat ion, In both
these cases the property and franchise of the corporation
would in fact be public property. Therefore, a gift to
a corporation created for public purposes is, in realitX
a gift to the public.
But if, on the other hand, the legislature should
incorporate a banking company for the benefit oi' the
corporators, and should give the corporators all the ne-
cessary funds, it would be a private corporation ; be-
cause a gift to such a corporation would be only a gift
to the corporators. Thus it seems that whether a cor-
poration is to be considered as public or private de-
pends upon the objects for which its franchises are to be
exercised.
The court then proceeds, that it is not necessary
to state whether an incorporated college, founded and
endowed by an individual, who had reserved to himself a
control over its affairs as a private visitor, is a
private or a public corporation, since it does not ap-
pear that Dartmouth College was subject to any private
visitat ion whatever. Bow much different is the view of
19
this situation taken by Chief-Justice Marshall will be
seen when we turn to the reports of the case in the
Federal Court.
The wording of the charter of the college itself
tends to the conclusion that the college is a public
corporation, since its purpose was to "spread the knowl-
edge of the great Redeemer' among the savages, and to
furnish 'the best means of education" to the youth of
New Hampshire. These purposes must certainly be mattes
of public concern. T or who has any private interest
either in the objects, or the property of this institu-
tion ? The office of trustee of Dartmouth College is
in fact a public trust as much as is the office of
governor, or of judge of this court ; and for any breach
of this trust the state has the unquestionable right
through its courts of justice to hail them, and call
then to account.
One of the statutes of New Hampshire, passed Decem-
ber 11, 1812 (New Hampshire Laws, 184) makes the shares
and interests of any person, in any incorporated company,
liable to be seized and sold on execution, and gives to
the purchaser all the privileges appertaining thereto.
It makes him therefore a member of the corporation. But
20
the thought probably never occurred to any man that when
a new member is added by virtue of an act, the corpora-
tion is thereby dissolved and a new one created. Yet
that act has at least as much dissolving and as much
creating force as the act now under consideration.
AS to the question of contract the gist of the argu-
ment for the plaintiff is this : A statute which at-
tempts to compel the members of a corporation to become
members of that corporation differently organized, with-
out their consent is invalid. "Neither of these
propositions are true*, says the court, "and if they
are true, the legitimate conclusion to be drawn from
them is wholly irrelevant to the question in the case'.
There is no doubt of' the power in the legislature to com-
pel 'individuals to accept the office of trustee of Dart-
mouth College, however the corporation may be organized,
any more than there is doubt of the rigpht of the leis-
lature to compel individuals -to serve as town officers,
or to be enrolled in the militia, or to be members of a
municipal corporation, as of a city or township. This
principal .is as old as the Bill of Rights, and is a
fundamental principle of all governments, that the Btate
2 1
has a paramount right to the personal services of its
citizens.
If the charter of a public institution, like that
of Dartmouth College, is to be construed as a contract
within the intent of the constitution of the United
States, it will be difficult to say what powers in rela-
tion to their public institutions, if any, are left to
the states. It is a construction repugnant to every
principle of good goverrment, because it places all the
public institutions of that state beyond legislative con-
trol. For it is clear that Congress possesses no power
on the subject. It is clear therefore that the charter
of Dartmouth College is not a contract within tk reraning
of this clause of the constitution of the United StateS.
But supposing it is a contract, how can it be construed ?
Is it a contract on the part of the king with,.the cor-
porators, whom he appointed, and their successors that
they should be forever free from all legislative inter-
ference, and that their number should not be augmented
or diminished however strongly public interest mig~ht re-
quire it ? Such a contract would be absurd, and repug-
nant to the principles of' all government. The king has
Note.-- In the argumnt before the Ne Iamshr
2i)
no power to make such a contract, neither has the le-is-
lature.
court MA*r. Jeremiah M.ason arranged his brief under
three heads.--
(1) The act is not within the general scope of
legislative power.
(2) It is in conflict with the constitution of
New Iampshire restraining legislative power.
(3) It is incompatible with the clause of the
Constitution of the United States which forbids
states to pass laws impairing the obligation of
contracts.
The case went to the United States Supreme Court
on the single point of contract. This feature of
the question was first raised by a layman, was con-
sidered of no value by lawyers, and received but
slight attention at the hands of Mr. Mason in his
argimvent before the New Hampshire court. And yet
in the court above it was sufficient to win the case
CHAPTER IV.
EFTORE TIE FEDERAL TRIBUNAL.
It was a dramatic moment in the life of the young
New Hampshire lawyer, when he stood before the court
to present his case. i e had mastered the argument ema-
nating from the keen and penetrating mincts of Jeremiah
Mason and Judge Smith. Fe was in possession of the
facts of the case, and the legal and political bearing
of every point. He knew the judges upon the bench,
their political history, their hopes, their ambitions
their political passions, caprices, and prejudices.
To all this was added the magnetic personality of one
of the great orators of history.
As the argument of the case proceeded, the genius
of the New Fampshire lawyer became apparent. He dwelt
with great force and strength upon the legal and consti-
tutional argutments advanced by Mason and Smith in the
court below. He frankly acknowledged himself a eom-
piler of the argument, anca stated that the material was
furnished by Smith and Mason, and that he had clumsily
24
put it together. But this putting together, this compi-
lation meant much when it was done by such a master as
was r. Webster. A high cast of mind that knows how to
judiciously take and use the work of other men is rare,
but this was his, and he did the work with consummate
skill.
He finally turned to the political features oii the
question. So delicately, with such art did he turn to
this aspect of the question, that even the great court
seemed apparently unconscious, that he was straying
beyond the realm of mere legal logic and reason, into
the field of political passion and prejudice. He pictur-
ed the prosperity of this little college, under the wise
administration of Federalism and the Church. Then it
was strong and vigorous. Now it was invaded by Jacobins
and Freethinkers. They had sought to wreck the young
republic, to involve it in European wars, to engender a
new revolution. Now they were raising their sacrileg-
ious hands against the temples of lear-ning.
As the strain of this resistless and solemn eloquerce
flowed on, the Chief-.Justice was thrilled by its plain-
tive yet mightappeal. A paean of war was chanted in
his ear . He was carried back to the early days of the
century, when, in the flush of young manhood, at the
head of his court, he had faced the triumphant Deriocrats.
Then he had preserved the ark of the constitution, had
saved the last bulwark of soumd government. Then he had
seen the turbulent waves of threatened revolution and
anarchy breaking harmlessly at is feet. Then he had
held at bay the maddened frenzy instigated by Genet and
the bloodhouMds of the French Revolution. Should de-
Democracy further intrench upon the constitution ?
Should the shrines of learning be defiled by rampant
Jacobinites and Freethinkers ? Should the unity Of.
these states be further threatened ? The joy of battle
was once more on. Again it was Federal ismagainst
Democracy. Again it was Marshall against Jefferson ;
again the Chief-Justice against the President. He
grasped anew his weapons, and with all the force of an
imperious will prepared to raise yet another constitu-
tional barrier across the path of his ancient enemies.
The st rain of resistless and solemn eloquence flowed on.
When ?Ir. Webster hact apparently finished, he stood
silent before the cournt for some moment8. Then drawing
26
himself up to his full height, assuming that imperious,
regal air which was as native to him as to a wild stag,
he proceeded,,--a
"This, sir, is my case. It is the case not merely
of that humble institution, it is the case of every co l-
lege in our land . . . . . . Sir, you may destroy this
little institution ; it is weak ; it is in yor hands
I know it is one of the lesser lights in the literary
horizon of our country. You may put it out. But if
you do so you must carry through your work. You must
extinguish one after another all those greater lights
of science which for more than a century have thrown
their radiance over our land. It is, sir, as I have
said, a sll college. And yet there are those who
love it."
Here his feelings mastered him. His eyes filled
with tears, and for some momenta he was unable to pro-.
ceed. In a moment he had regained his composure.
*Sir', said he in that deep tone with which he
thrilled his hearers, "I know not how others may feel
(glancing at the opponents of the college before him),
but for myself, when I see my Alma Mater surrounded, like
Caesar in the Senate-House, by those who are reiterating
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stab after stab, I would not, for this rigt hand, have
her turn to me, and say 'and thou too, my son
This burst of feeling was perfetly genuine on
tr. Webster's part. Great orator that he was, he, for
the moment at least, felt profoundly the words he was
speaking. It no doubt lad its influence on the court.
Mr, Goodrich, an eye witness of the trial, has left us an
account of it. e says that Chief-Justice MArshall's
eyes were suffused with tears, and that the countenance
of Mr. Justice Wahington w-::s as pale and livid as marble
The other members of the court were also deeply moved,
while the entire audience seemed spell-bound. After
such a master effort, the speeches of the opposing coun-
sel seemed cheap and ineffective.
Chief-Justice iarshall announced at the close of
the argmentthat the judges coula not come to any agree-
ment. There was at that time cioubtless a majority
against the college. During the vacation which followe
there was some very effective log-roA in; done by ?~r.Web-.
ster and Mr. Mason aided by their associates. Supple-
m ental briefs were sent to certain members of the bench,
and as studiously withheld from others. Chancellor Kent
was quietly influenced to take in h r. >'. Justice
Livingston arnd Mr. Just ice Johnson ; the work of r'.,Ts-
tice Story of assachusetts was by no means ineffective.
Such a thing wulcL scarcely be attempted at tids time,
but -in this case t. .e whole matter was as carefully and
astutely managed as a political cFnpaign.
In the interim- preparation was made by the defend-
ants for a rehearing of the cFse. M-r. Pinkney, at that
time probably the ablest lawyer in the United States,
was retained, but at this late stage he could be of lit-
tle use. The case was practically lost to the defend-
ants, and the retention of eminent comsel was vain.
Already had the rains descended, and the floods come,
and had beaten upon this case ; and it had fallen. At
the opening of the terra of" court in the following October,
a rehearing of the case was moved by Mr. Pinkney, wut
Chief-Just ice MIarshall and.ounced that during the vacation
the judg es had cotte to an agreement. He then proceeded
to read one of his great opinions, in which he held the
charter of Dartmouth College to be a contract, and there-
Note.--In this chapter, 1 make no effort to justify
Mason or Webster or their associates in th eir con-
duct during the managenp~t of "this case. I sn simp-
ly concerned in setting forth the facts as I have
found then to be.
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fore irreparable by state laws.
The Chief-Justice speaks of thi e caution and cir-
cumspection with which the court approaches a case which
calls in question the validity of an act of a state
legislature. He says that in no doubtful case will the
court take upon itself the tasi of derlaring a legisla-
tive act contrary to the const itution. But the American
People have said in the Constitution of the United Stateg
'"No state shall pass a law impairing the obligation of
contracts, and in the same instrument they have declared
that the judicial power 8hall extend to all eases in law
and equity arising under the Constitution." The court
therefore has a duty imposed upon it from which it dare
not shrink.
The heads unit er which the opinion is set forth are :
(1) Is this contract protected by the Constitution
of the United States ?
(2) Is it impaired by the acts under which the de-
fIendant holds ?
He first shows what species of contracts are in-
cluoed in the constitutional prohibit ion of the state
laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and points
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out the fallacy of extending to the word contract the
broadest possible meaning. Thus this section of the
Constitution w;.s never intended to extend to other con-
tracts than those which respect property, or some object
of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a
court. It was not intended to restrict the legisla-
ture, for example, on the subject of divorce.
Next he takes up and discusses through several
pages the proposition that Dartmouth College is a pri-
vate, eleemosynary corporation, from the fact that the
funds given by the original grantor were the sources of
payment of instructor's salaries, and these salaries
lessened the expense of education to students. It is
then an eleemosynary institution, and so far as respects
its funds, a private corporation. This is in sharp
contrast with the opinion of the court below. In the
next place the court takes up the proposition that the
charter of Dartmouth College is a contract, the obliga-
tion of which c 3nnot be impaired by a state law.
The donors of the original grants, even if they
could be found, have now no interest in the property,
and are therefore unaffected by any change that nay be
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made by the legislature in the college charter. These
founders do not complain, neither do the youth for whose
benefit it was founded, of the changes made in the
charter. Does this ease therefore come under the
constitution ? 'Contracts, the parties to which have
a vested, beneficial interest, and those only," it has
been said, 'are the objects about which the constitu-
tion is solicitous, and to which its protection is ex-
tended', According to the theory of the British Consti-
tution their Parliament e omnipotent. To annul oorpor-
ate rights might give a shook to public opinion. If the
Parliament had, at the emanation of the charter, annuiled
the Instrument, -t,-the perfidy of this action would have
been almost universally acknowledged. Yet then, as now,
the same situation and state of facts exist. The donors
would have had no right in the property, neither would
the students have had rights to be violated, nor the
trustees have any private, beneficial, individual inter-
est in the property. Therefore in reason, in Justice,
and in law, it ii now what it was in 1769. This char-
ter is then a contract ; the donors, the trustees, and
the crown were the original parties.
It is a eontract made on a valuable consideration,
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for the security and disposition of property, for the
conveyance of real and personal estate. It is a contract
within the letter and the spirit of the Constitution,
unless the fact that the property is invested by the
donors in trustees for the prorrotion of religious and
educational ends, for the benefit of persons who are
continually changing, though the object renrains the same,
shall create a particular exception taking this case
out of the prohibition contained in the constitution.
The court next proceeds to show theft the act of the
New Hampshire legislature of June 27, and Deeember 13
and 26, 1816, impaired the obligation of the charter of
Dartmouth College. It is too clear to require argunent,
that all rights respecting property rerrain unchanged by
the Revolution. The obligation in the new were there-
fore the same as in the old government. The power ofthe
g9vernment was therefore the same.
The next point touched ulvn by the court is-, that
the trustees of Dartmouth College have a beneficial
interest therein, because thle charter provides, that in
ease of a vacancy in that office, "the senior professor
or tutor, being one of the trustees, shall exercise the
office of president, until the trustees shall rmke choice
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of and appoint a president, But the court later says
that it is unneoessary to elaborate this point, being of
opinion on general principles, that in these private,
eleemosynary institutions, the body corporate possesses
the whole legal and equitable interest, and completely
represents the donors for the purpose of executing the
trust. So the body corporate has rights which are
protected by the constitution.
Mr. Justice Washington concurs in an opinion of
L
considerable length extending over some eleven pages.
Mr. Justice Johnson concurred for reasons given by the
Chief-Justice ; while Mr. Justice Livingston eoncurred
for reasons stated by the Chief-Justice, and Justices
Washington and Story. Mr. Just ioe Story concurs in an
elaborate opinion of nearly fifty pages in length ;
while Mr. Justice Duvall dissented without opinion.
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CHAPTER V.
THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
Their Provisions for Revoking a Corporate Franehise.
No sooner was the decision in the Dartmouth College
case rendered, than we perceive a reaction setting in
from many directions, to circumvent what seemed an un-
just rule, It was feared that this decision tolled the
death knell of state sovereignty, and laid a precedent
for state suicide. Corporations under their charters
could now, without fear of state interference, reach out,
and gather to themselves doninion and power. The inde-
pendence conferred upon these corporations was such as
the East India Company in its palmiest days never posses-
sed, nor ever aspired to attain, It was a Magna Charta
of corporations. We turn now to the state constitu-
tions in their amendments and revisions, and first come
upon this determination to be rid of a cumbersome and
laborious rule.
Judge Cooley in his Constitutional Law points out
that where, by the charter the legislature reserves the
right to alter, amend, or repeal it, it is plain that no
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interferenee with vested rights can follow ; because
then an alteration, amendment or repeal is in accordance
with the contract, and not hostile to it. So if the
constitution of the state, or by its general laws in
force when the charter was granted, it is provided that
all charters shall be subject to legislative control and
alteration, this provision in legal effect becomes a
part of the charter, and therefore a part of the contract
Let us now turn to the subject of the reservation
of power by the state to revoke a corporate franshise
as laid down in the different state constitutions,
(1)Constitution of Alabama, 1875. Art. XIII, Sec.3 & 10
says,..-- *The general assembly shall not remit the for-
feiture of the charter of any corporation now existing,
or alter or amend the same, or pass any general or
special law for the benefit of such corporation, other
than in execution of a trust enacted by law or by con-
tract, except upon the conlition that such corporation
shall thereafter hold its charter subject to the pro-
visions of this constittut ion.
"The general assembly shall have the power to alter,
revoke or amend any charter of incorporation now exist-
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ing, and revocable at the ratification of this consti-
tution, or any that may hereafter be created whenever
in their opinion it may be injurious to the citizens of
the state, in such manner, hiowever, that no injustice
shall be done to the corporators. No law hereafter
enacted shall create, renew or extend the clhrter of
more than one corporation,"
(2) Constitution of New York, 1846. Art.VIII,Sec.l
of Corporations says, -- '. . a .All general laws and
special acts passed pursuant to this section may be
altered from time to tine or repealed."
(3) Constitution of Arkansas, 1874. Art.XII,Sec.6,
*Corporations may be founded under beneral laws, which
laws may from time to time be altered or repealed.
The general assembly shall have the power to alter, re-
voke or annul any charter of incorporation now existing,
and revocable at the adoption of this constitution, or
any that may hereafter be created, whenever in their
opinion it may be injurious to the citizens oI the state;
in such manner, however, that no injustice sh~±l be
done to the corporators."
(4) Constitution of California,1879. Art.XII, Sec. 3
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"Corporations may be formed under 7eneral lass but shall
not be created by special act. All laws no in force
in this state concerning corporations, and all laws that
may be hereafter passed pursuant to this section, nay be
altered from time to time or repealed."
(5) Constitation of Colorado,1876. Art.XV, Sec.S,
"The general assembly shall have power to alter, revoke,
or annul any charter of a corporation now existing and
revocable at the adoption of this constitution, or any
that may hereafter be created, whenever in their opinion
it may be injurious to the citizens of the state ; in
such nanner, however, that no injustice shall be done to
the corporators.
(6) Constitution of Connecticut,1818. Art.X,Sec.3,
"The rigfhts and duties of all corporat ion8 shall rem.4in
as if this constitution Ind not been mdopted ; with the
exception of such regulations and restrictions as are
contained in this constitution."
(7) Constitution of Delaware,18$.Amendrnent rati-
fied January 28, i875. Art.I, Sec.17, "The legislature
shall have power to enact a general incorporation act
to provide for incorporation of religious, charitable
and manufacturing purposes ; . . . . and no attempt slftll
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be made in such act or otherwise, to limit or qualify
the power of revocation reserved to the legislature in
this section'.
(8) Constitution of Florida,1868. Art.XVII,Sec.24,
*The property of all corporations, whether heretofore or
hereafter incorporated, shall be subject to taxation,
unless such corporatio :be for religious, eduoationml,
or charitable purposes". This is all there is on the
subJ ec t of corporkt iors in the Const itution of Flor ida,
but it was amended in 1875 so as to read,-- "Unless such
property be held an used exclusively for religious,
educational, or charitable purposes'.
(9) Constitution of Georgia,1868. On the question
of the revocation of a corporate franchise the Constitu-
tion of Georria is silent. It prohibits the granting
of corporate powers to private companies except to bank-
ing, insurance, railroad, canal, naviat ion, mining,
express, lumber manufacturing, and telegraph companies.
(10) Constitution of Illinois,1870, Art.II, Sec.15,
"The general assembly shall pass laws to correct abuses,
and prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in the
rates of freight and passenger tariffs on the different
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railroads in the state, and enforce such laws by adequate
penalties to the extent if necessary for that purpose,
of forfeiture of their property and franchises,"
(11) Constitution of Indiana,1851. The constitu-
tion of Indiana is silent on the general subject of the
revocation of - corport:te franchise, except in the case
of municipal corporations. Art. XVI, Sec. 4 provides,-
*All acts of corporation for municipal purposes shall
continue under this constitution until such time as the
general assembly shall, in its discretion, modify or
repeal the same'. Setion 16, which is an extension of
the sane doctrine provides,-- "The general assembly may
order or amend the charter of Olarksville, and make such
regulations as may be necessary for carrying into effect
the objects contemplated in granting the sae ; and the
funds belonging to said town shall be applied according
to the intention of the grantors.*
(12) Constitution of Iowa,1857. Art.VIIi, See.12,-
' The general assembly shall have power to mend or re-
peal all laws for the organization of, or creation of
corporat ions, or granting of' special or exclusive privi-
leges, or ixununities by a vote of two-thirds of each
40
branch of the general assembly ; and no exclusive privi-
leges, except as in this article provided shall ever be
granted.'R
(13) Constitution of' Arkansas, 1859. Art.XII, See.l,
"The legislature shall pass no special act conferring
corporate powers. Corporations may be created under
general laws ; but all such alaws Tay be amendecL or
repealed.'
(14) The Constitution of Kentucky of 1850 is silent
on the subject of the corporate franehise.
(15) The Constitution of Louisiana, 1868, is also
silent on the revocation of a corporate franchise.
(16) The Constitution of Mlaine, 1820, is also silent
on the question of corporations. But in the amendment
to that instrument in 1876, Article IV, Section 14., pro-
vides, -- 'Corporations shall be formed urder general
laws, and shall not be created 1)y special acts of the
legislature, except for mUnicipal purposes, and in eases
where the objects of the corporation cannot otherwise
be attained ; and however forfmed they shall forever be
subject to the general laws of the state'.
(17) Constitution of M.,aryland, 1867. Art. III, See.48,
provides,-- "All charters granted (to corporations) and
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0 . , . heretofore granted and areated subject to re-
peal or modification, may be altered, from time to time,
or repealed ; provided, nothing herein eontained shall
be construed to extend to banks or the incorporation
thereof.'
(18) Constitution of Massachusetts,1780. In the
Constitution of Maessahusetts the subject of corporations
is but once mentioned, and then to the effect that no
corporation or man has either advantage or privilege !
distinct from those of the commnity.
(19)Constitution of Miahigan,1850. Amendment to
Article XV, Section 1, "Corporations may be formed under
general laws, but shall not be created by special act,
except for municipal purposes. All laws passed puraant
to this section may be amended, altered, or repealed'.
(20) Constitution of Minnesota,1857. In its see-
tion devoted to corporations the Constitution of Min-
nesota says nothing about the power of the legislature
to revoke a charter, or to alter or change such charter
after it has been granted.
(21) Constitution of Mississippi, This document
says nothing about the power of the legislature to alter
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or revise a corporate charter once granted, except as
provided in Article XIT, Section 17,-"Liabilities of
corporations shrili be secured by legislative enactnent'.
(22) Constitution of > issouri,l875. Art.XII,Sec.3,
'The general assembly shall not remit the forfeiturc of
the charter of any corporation now existing, or alter,
or amend such forfeited charter, or pass any other gener-
al or special laws for the benefit of such corporation',
(23) Constitution of" Nebraska, 1875v Art.XISeo,7,-
'The le,:.islature shall pass laws to prevent abuses mid
prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in all
charges of express, telegraph, and railroad companies in
this state ; and enforce such laws by adequate penalties,
to the extent if necessary for that purpose of forfeiture
of their property and franchises".
(24) Constitution of Nevada,1864. Art.VIII, See.l,0--
'Corporations may be formed uncer general laws, and all
such laws m1y from time to time be altered or repealed'.
Section 4 provides, -- mCorporations created by or unlder
the laws of the territory of Nevada shall be suibjeet to
the provision of such laws until the legislature shall
pass laws regulat ing the s:-rne in pursuance of the pro-
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vision& of this constitution.'
(25) Constitution of New Hampshire, 1792. Bill of
Rights, Art. XV provides,-- 'That no subject shall be
arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his
property, inmunities, or privileges, put out of the pro-
tection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life,
liberty, or estate, but by judgment of his peers or the
law of the land.* This point is argued by Mr.MWson in
his brief before the New Hampshire court at considerable
length. That part of the brief devoted to this point
covers some ten pages in Farrar's Report of the famous
trial. As corporations are a creation of the later
statutes, there is but little in the early constitutions
regarding them. The charter of New Hampshire, 1792,
is silent on the subject of corporations. Amendnent to
Article IV, Section 11 says,-- 'Corporate powers of
every nature obtained shall . . . . . be subject to re-
peal or alteration at the will of the legislature'.
(26) Constitution of North Carolina, 1868. Art.VIII,
Se .-. . . all general laws and special acts
passed pursuant to this section nay be altered, from
time to time, or repealed.' Amendment to the Constitu-
tion ot' North Carolina, 1876, Article VIII, Sec.1,--
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'All general laws ana special acts passed pursuant to
this section may be altered from time to time or re-
pealed.'0
(27) Constitution of Ohio, 1851. Art. XVII, Sec. 2,.-
'Corporations may be formed under general laws ; but all
such laws may from time to time be altered or repealed.'
(28) Constitution of Oregon, 1857. Art. XI, Cor-
porations, See. 2,-- "All laws passed pursuant to this
section may be altered, amended, or repealed, but not
so as to impair or destroy any vested corporate rights,"
(29) Constitution of Pennsylvania, 1873. Art. XVI,
Corporations, Se. 10,-- 'The general assembly shall
have the power to alter, revoke, or amend any charter of
incorporation now existing and revocable at the adoption
of this constitution, or any that may hereafter be
created, whenever in their opinion it may be injurious
to the citizens of this commonwealth ; in such manner
however, that no injustice shall be done to the corpora-
tore'.
($0) Constitution of Rhode Island, 1842 says
nothing about the revoking or revising of charters by
the legislative power.
(51) Constitution of South Carolina, 1868. Art.XI,
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Corporations, See. 1, -- "Corporations may be formed
under the general laws ; but all mieh laws may from
time to time be altered or repealed'.
(32) Constitution of Tennessee, 1870. Art. XI,
See. 8,-- *The general assembly shall provide by general
laws for the organization of all corporations hereafter
created which laws may at any time be altered or re-
pealed ; and no such alteration or repeal shall inter-
fere with or divest rights whioh have boeene vested.*
(33) Constitution of Texas, 1876. Art. X11, Private
Corporations, See. 3,-- 'The right to authorize and
regulate freights, tolls, fares . . . . shall never be
relinquished or abandoned by the state, but shall always
be under legislative control, and depend upon legislative
authority.'
(34) Constitution of Vermont, 1793 and the Amend-
ments down to 1870, are silent as to the legislative
power to revoke a corporate eharter. Constitution of
Vermont of 1777 provides that-the legislature may grant
chart ers of incorporat ion.
(35) Constitution of Virginia, 1870 is also silent
on the power of the legislature to revoke or arrand a
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corporate charter. It provides for power to tax cor-
porations the same as other property.
(36) Constitution of West Virginia, 1872. Art.IX,
See. 5,-- *No charter of incorporation shall be granted
# . . . unless the right be reserved to alter or amend
such charter at the pleasure of the legislature to be
declared by general laws.'
(37) Constitution of Wisconsin, 1848. Art. XI, Cor-
porations, says,-- "All general laws, or special acts
enacted under the provisions of this section way be
altered or repealed by the legislature at any tire after
their passage'.
(38) Constitution of North Dakota, 1889. Art.VIII,
Corporations, Sec. t3-- , . .any laws so passed (ac-
cording to this section) shall be subject to future
repeal or alteration."
(39) Constitution of South Dakota, 1889. Art.XVII,
Sec. 9,-- 'The legislature shall have power to alter,
revise or amerxd any charter of any corporation now
existing and revocable at the taking effect of this con-
stitution, or any that may be created . . . . in such a
rranner that no injustice shall be done to the inicorpora-
tors.'0
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(40) Constitution of Montana, 1889. Art.XV, Cor-
porations, Sea. 2,--'Any such laws shall be subj ect to
future repeal, or alteration by the legislative assembly!
(41) Constitution of Washington, 1889, Article XII,
Corporations, Sec. 1,-- *All laws relating to corpora-
tions may be altered, amended, or repealed by the legis-
lature at any time, and all corporations doing business
in this state may, as to such businessbe regulated,
limited, or restrained by law.'
(42) Constitution of Idaho, 1889. Art. XI, Corpora-
tions, See. a, -- '. .. Any such general law shall be
subject to future repeal or alteration by the legisla-
ture.'
(43) Constitution of Wyoming, 1889. Art. X, Cor-
porations, See. 1,-- 'All laws relating to corporations
may be altered, amended, or repealed by the legislature
at any tirm when necessary for the public good, and
general welfare, and all corporations doini business in
this state may as to such business be regulated, limited,
or rest rained by laws not in conflict with the Con stitu-
tion of the United States.'U
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(44) The Qonstitution6 of New Jersey are all silent,
containing not a word on the subject of corporations.
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CHAPTER VI.
FRANCHISES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS.
Having traced the provisions of the diffierent state
constitutions regarding the corporate franchise, we will
now turn briefly aside to look at the more particular
meaning of this term. What is a franchise, and what is
the principle umderneath all which has restricted the
legislature in the revocation of this privilege F
A franchise is a right or privilege conferred by
law. It is a special privilege conferred by government
upon individuals, ano, which does not belong to the
citizens of the country generally, of comwon right. It
is essential to the character of a franchise, that it
should be a grant from the sovereign authority, and in
this country no franchise can be held which i not de-
rived from a law of the state. Thus when the legisla-
ture grants a charter of incorporation, it confers upon
the grantees the rights of forming a corporation, and
of acting within certain prescribed limits. It is con-
ferred upon the individual grantees,together with such
other persons as uay become members of the associat ion
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either by transfer of shares, or by the ereation of new
shares which the legislature has authorized the company
to issue. Carters sometimes confer powers to take pri-
vate property for public use, but most of the contitu-
tions of' the states provide, that no corporation shall
take private property for public use without the due
Compensation required under the Constitution of the
United State s. 1
Article I, Sec. 10 of the Constitution of the United
States provides that, --m'No state shafl . . . pass any
bill of attainder, e fjo law, or law impairing
the obligations of contracts'. A state eonstItution
adopted by a vote of the people is a law within this
prohibition.2
The XIV Amendment of the. Constitution provides that
no state 'shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, or deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the
laws' .
The V Amendment, limiting the power of' the Federal
Government, provides that no person shall 'be deprived
(1) Railroad Company v. MceClure, 10 Wallace,5ll,
(2) Morawetz on Corporations.
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of life, liberty, or property without due process of' law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use with-
out just compensation". Similar provisions in the
constitutions of the several states limit the powers of
the state legislatures.
All these provisions are designed to enforce a
generz-l principle of right which lies at the foundation
of all political liberty. The principle is that all men
have a natural, and inherent right to life, liberty, and
property ; or life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness. To secure these rights governments are instituted
artong men, and any interference with inherent
rights can be justified only as a means of securing the
most fundamental rights, and then only at the demnarf of
public safety, or public security.
A state is prohibited by the constitution from pass-
ing a law altering the purpose of a corporation, as set
out in the charter, because such a law would impair the
contract existing between the members oV the association.
Such a law would violate tho rights of each individual
share holder ; and the majority could not by their assent
dispose of' the rights of the minority. A l~iw such as
is here mentioned would be unconstitutional, because it
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would be without due process of law, and without due coM-
pensation.I  This point was dwelt upon by Mr. !vliason be-
fore the New Hampshire court in the Dartmouth College
case at great length. His effort was to show that the
act of the New Hampshire legislature took away from the
corporation its invested funds, and put them in new
hands,-- namely, the new Board of Trustees.
A law dissolving a corporation, or rendering the
future transaction of its business, and the performance
of the agreement of association illegal, would likewise
be unconstitutional irrespective of any contract between
the state and the corporators. The constitutionality
of a law, altering the charter of a charitable institu-
tion, depends upon the eff ect of such a law upon the
funds of the institution. The members of a purely
charitable corporation are not umited like the mmbers
of a business eompany. Their duties are those of trus-
tees, who are to administer the funds according to the
terms of the charter.
The term contract is used in the constitution in its
broadest sense. 2  It applies to all contractual obliga-
(1) Sinking Funa Cases, 99 U.S., 737.
(2) Chief-Justice Marshall in his opinion in the Dart-
mouth College Case construes the word contract as
used in the Constitution in a more limited sense.
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tions whether they be called contracts in technical
phraseology or not. Grants, as well as unexecuted agree-
ments, trusts and comnon law areements are protected. 1
The doctrine that a grant of franchise by act of the
legislature, when accepted by the grantees, becomes a
contract within the pr-otection of the constitution of the
United States, implies that the legislature iraking the
grant had not only the intention, but also the power to
make a contract or treaty on behalf of the state that
the franchise shall be irrevocable. It is well settled
by the higheet authority that such a power does exist to
a limited extent, unless it is expressly taken away by
the state constitution. It is also well settled that
each state has certain powers which no legislature can
limit even in a particular case by a ccntract, or ir-
revocable grant of franchise. These are the police
powers. It is therefore in excess of the power delegat-
ed by the people to the legislature to abridge these
powers by contract, or grant of franchises. 2
(1) Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S., 749.
(2) Stone v. Mississippi, l0l,U.S.,814. Beer Oo.y.
Mass., 97 U.S., 33. Boyd V. Alabara, 94 U.S.,
645. Regents of Univ. v. Williams,9 3. & G.,36,
State v. Morris, 77 N.C., 512. Dinib-ian v.Peopl
51 III., 191. Lake View v. Rose Yill Cemetery
Cc., 70 Ill., 191. State v.WoodwarO, 89 Ind.,lIiO.
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C APTER VI I.
SEqTJENCE FFATURES AS PORTRAYED IN LEADING CASES.
The sequence features of this case might be traced
through a considerable period ; but in a work necessari-
ly brief like this it seems best to look only at some
later phases of the aoctrine. A glance at the cases
will readily show how far we have drifted on the stream
of legal data and of constitutional controversy from
the rule enunciated by Chief-Justice larshall more than
seventy-five years ago.
In the case of Matthews v. The St. Louis & S.F.Rail-
road Company, 24 S.W. Reporter, 591, an action was
brought by the plaintiff for damages caused by fire set
by sparks Irom a locomotive owned and operated by the
defendant. In the answer to the complaint, the defend-
ant averred that the act of the legislature making the
company an insurer was illegal, unconstitutional, and
void, in that it denies to the defendant the equal pro-
tection of the laws contrary to the provisions of Article
XIV, Section 1 of the amendments to t1e Constitution of
the United States ; and that it deprives the defendant
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of his property without due process of law, contrarj to
the provisions of Article V of the amendnents of the
Constitution of the United States ; and in this thAt it
impairs the obligation of contracts made between the
staxe of Missouri and the defendant by the terms of which
it was impliedly agreed that said aefendant might and
could use fire for the purpose of generating steam to
propel locomotive engines and cars attached thereto, and
to be responsible for the negligent and careless use
thereof.
In the nmtter of the impairment of the obligation
of contracts the Supreme Court of Missouri, speaking
through Judge Gantt, denied that the statute did so Ima-
pair the obligation of contracts, as set forth in the
Dartmouth College case. It does not impair or revoke
vested rights. The court says that the defendant's
charter is a contract with the state ; but that this
statutory regulation, requiring the ccmpany to take
the risk of an insurer, and so become responsible in
damages to every person and corporation whose property
may be injured or de stroyed by fire, oonunicated direct-
ly or indirectly by locorotive engines in use upon the
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railroad owned and operated by such railroad corpora-o
tions, does not imipair the obligation of such contract.
It has often been held that this clpuse of the Consti-
tution of the T.nited States does not so far remove from
state control the ri,jits and properties which depend
for their existence, or enforcement, upon contracts as
to relieve them from the operation of such general regu-
lations for the good government of the state, and the
protection of the ri,(-hts of individuals as may be deemed
important. All contracts and all rights are subj ect
to this power ; and all such regulations nuist from time
to time be subject to such change as the well being of
the eor-unity requires.
Therefore if the legislature regards it necessary
to pass a law fixing the liability of railroads for
fires kindled by their locomotives in order to protect
the property of neighboring citizens, there is nothing
in the state or Federal Constitutions that can curtail
this power. The state has and can have no higher
function than to care for and protect the property of
its citizens and their own safety. All laws and all
charters are p~issed subject to this duty whenever it rn~y
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arise.
The BingharIton Bridge Case, 3 Wallace, 51,
is one that stancis on the rule laid down in the Dartmouth
College case. ere the state had incorporated a
oompany to build a toll bridge, and to take tolls, In
the sam act it hao provided that it should not be law-
ful for amAy person or persons to erect any bridge within
two miles either above or below that bridge. This
statute is held to mean, not only that no person or asso-
ciat ion of persons shall erect such a briAge without
leSislative authority, but that the legislature itself
will not make it lawful for any person or association of
persons to do so by giving them authority.
A subsequent act of the legislature, granting a
charter to another bridge company who built a bridge a
few rods above the old one, was held void as impairing
the obligation of cautract. The case of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward was cited and approved.
Chief-Justice Chase and Just ices Field and Grier
dissented from the opinion of i tr Justice Davis in this
case. M'r. Justice Grier delivered the dissenting opin-
ion which seems somnct in its principles, and vigorous in
its clear-cut discrimination.
In Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 United States, 679,
the charter of a bank, granted by the lejislature of
Tennessee, provides tiat tne bank, "shall pay to the
state an annual tax of one-half of one per cent. on each
share of the capital stock subscribed which shall be
in lieu of all other taxes! The rule was laid down in
this case that the provision is a contract between the
state and the bank limiting the amount of tax to each
share of the stock ; and that a subsequent revenue law
of the state, imposing an additional tax on the shares
in the hanes of stockholders, impairs the obligation of
that contract and is void. Case of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward is cited and affirmed.
To this opinion of the court Mr. Justice Stong with
whom concurred Justices Clifford and Field dissented.
"If there be any doctrine founded in Justice",
Says Mir. Justice Stong,"and necessary to the safety and
continued existence of a state, it is that all presump-.
tions are against the legislative intent to relinquish
the power of taxation over a species of property.'
Citing the Providence Eank v. Billings, 4 Peters, 514,
in support of this he quotes from the words of Chief-
Justice Marshall, *As the whole comMunity is interested
in retaining it (the power to tax) undiminished, that
comnunity has a right to insist that its abandonrrnt
ought not to be presumed in a ease in which the deliber-
ate purpose of the state to abandon does not appear'.
Mr, Justice Strong further cites in support of his
position, The Ohio Life &a. Company v. Debolt, 16
Howard, 416. The Delaware Railroad Tax Case, 18 Wal-
laee, 2066 Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wallace, 573.
Gordon v. The Appeal Tax Court, 3 Howard, 133. People
v. the Conmissioners, 4 Wallace, 244.
In the ease of the Citizens Street Railway Company
v. The City Railway Company, 56 Yederal Reporter, 746,
the question as to what is a contract under the clause
of the Constitution of the United States forbidding the
impairing of the obligation of contraete is taken up.
In this case it was held that city ordinances, made in
pursuance of law and granting to a corporation the right
to build and operate Street Railway lines in the city
after acceptance by the corporation, and the expenditure
of large sums of zroney on the faith thereof, constitute
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a contract protected by the Constitution of the United
Stat es.
The case is this. In March, 1891, the leglsla-w
ture of Indiana passed a law conferring upon the city of
Indianapolis the power, by contract, when approved by
the ordinance of the Common Council, to grant franehises
to Street Railroad Companies. The Board of Public
Works accordingly exercised this power with the aproval
of the Com.on Council, and conferred upon a new company
the right to operate and construot a street railway.
The old company which lad now been in operation some
years, brought suit against the new company. Defendant
filed bill to have complaint dismissed, The act of the
Common Council was held to be a law within the meaning
of the Constitution of the United States, Article I,
Seetion 10.
Now the complainant in this case, a corporation)
had derived its rights under ordiranoes of the city of
Indianapolis adopted pursuant to law in the years 1864,
1865, 1880, 1888, and 1889. These ordinances expressly
provided that 'the said city of Indianapolis shall not
during all the time to which the privilegs hereby grant-
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ed to said company shall extend, grant to, or confer upon
any person or corporation any privilege which will impair
or destroy the rights and privileges herein granted to
said company." The act was clearly an infringement
upon a vested right, as the plaintiff had suffered, or
was about to suffer great dvnages. The court accordingly
held that the grant of rights, privileges, and imnnities
to the complainant, coupled with the acceptance and the
expenditure of large sums of money on faith thereof was
a contract under the protection of" the Constitution of
the United States. The motion of the defendant to
dismiss the complaint was accordingly overruled.
In Commonwealth v. Owensboro et al. Railroad Com-
panies, 23 S.W. Reporter, 868, the rule is laid down
that an act, passed in 1856, reserving to the legisla-
ture the right to repeal or amend charter privileges,
granted by the legislature to particular persons, does
not enable the legislature to repeal the act of 1884., --
exempting railroads from taxation for a space of five
years-- since it is clearly a case of impairment of a
contrac t obli gat ion.
Quoting from Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wallace, 454,
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a leading case on the subject, the court says,- -'lmmuni-
ty from taxation, constituting in these cases a part of
the contract with the government, is by the reservation
of the power, Suah as is contained in the law of 1856,
subject to be revoked equally with any other provision
of the charter whenever the legislature may deem it ex-
pedient for the public interest that the revocation shall
be niade. But the court goes on to say that if this
proposition were applied to the persons who had accepted
the offer of the state to exempt from taxation certain
property for five years, and had on the strength of the
promise of the state acquired rights and interests, and
had invested money in this enterprise, it would be un-
just in an extraordinary degree. Upon the adoption of
the act of exemption from taxation, no contract was made
with any person, natural or artifioial, though by accept-
ing its terms certain rights might be secured thereunder
of the nature of contract rights. But no reservation,
express or implied, can be aid to have been made therein
by virtue of the act o±f 1856. The law is general, and
therefore revocable at pleasure ; but from this it does
not follow that it might be revoked so as to injuriously
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affect the citizens accepting its provision, in viola-
tion of the pledge of the state and the cornmon principles
of Justice. To promote the ends of development, to
afford greater facilities for transportation, and to
bring into its borders an increased volume of property
shortly to help bear the commron tax burden, the state
says to the railroad people,-- Expend your capital and
build up your enterprises arm.ong us, and in consideration
of your effort, we will give you a brief respite from
the burdens of taxation.' The state cannot withdraw
its pledge of immunity from those who acted upon the
assurances of this act.
In the case of the Manhattan Trust Company v.
The City of Dayton, 59 Federal Reporter, 327, the ques-
tion as to whether a provision of the Common Council,
fixing the maximum price of gas, is a contract, or an
exercise of' the power to regulate, and a limitation on
the license granted, is raised. The rule laid down in
the case was, that when a municipal council is authorized
by statute to contract for a period not exceeding ten
years, its contract for twenty years, or for an in~2fi-
nite time cannot be sustained as a contract for ten years,
but is entirely voids
Under a statute empowering municipal councils to
regulate from time to time the price of gas, and authori-
izing them to bind themselves by contract not to reduce
the price below an agreed minimum for ten years, a
council contracted for r.rinimum schedule rates by vmixure
measure" for five years. Afterwards it passed an ordi-
nance providing in one section that consurLirs might elect
to have gas furnished by meter, instead of at the
schedule rates, in which case a maximum price was fixed
without any limitation of time. A subsequent seetion
declared that the contract before made should continue
in force, 'except as herein altered', for the unexpired
time thereof. It was held that the provision for a
maximum price was not a contract, but a regulation,
and therefore alterable at pleasure.
We find, therefore, that the law as laid down in
the Dartmouth College case has been somewhat changed
and restricted. The constitutions of the states haVe
in almost all cases asserted their authority to repeal,
alter, revoke, or amend, in whatsoever way they may
please, all charters ranted to corporations. As the
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constitution is law, and as all persons know the law,
the @onstitution is therefore a part of the charter and
so of the contract. The changes made by the legisla-
ture are, of course, to be within the bounds of the con-
stitution of the United States (Article I, See. 10) pro-
hibiting any law impairing the obligation of contracts,
and the disruption of vested rights. In most of those
states where the constitutions are silent, as to the
power of the legislature to alter or revoke a charter,
the statutes confer this power. This is the ease in
Massachusetts, while in other states the power is both
statutory and oonstitutional.A This virtually elimin-
ates the contrast feature from the charter of a corpora-
tion, so far as the United States Constitution is con-
cerned, and leaves that charter at the caprice of the
legislature. This is no doubt the correct theory as is
shown in some of the dissenting opinions cited in this
chapter, (Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S., 679) since
the State is of more value than any corporation.
E~ut to define what is a contract, and what i8 a law,
under the United tates Constitution, are still matters
(1) Stimson's American Statute Law.
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of legal controversy. We have found that a law making
a railroad company an insurer for all damages arising
from fire set by its locomotives does not impair a con-
tract obligation. (Matkhews v. The St. Louis & S.r1.Rail-
road Company, 24 S.W. Reporter, 591). Again where the
state incorporates a company to exclusively carry on
certain business, and subsequently grants to another
company power to do a like business, it is held to
impair a contract obligation. (The Binghamton Bridge Casq
3 Wallace, 51.) So a promise of the state to tax
a corporation a certain per Cent. and no more is a
contract, and a subsequent revenue law imposing an extra
burden is void. (Cormvonwealth v.Owensboro et al.
Railroad Companies, 23 S.W. Reporter, 868.)
Again a city ordinance passed by the consent of the
legislature is held a law, and as it impaired the obliga-
tion of a former contract of the corporation with the
state, it also is void. (Citizens Street Railway Com-
pany v. The City Railw' ay Company, 56 5 ederal Reporter,
746.) And lastly, a provision oZ7 a city's Co, non
Council, miakir< a certain ajreemont under statutory
authority with the citixens of the city, vas altered 80
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as to give the citizens a choice of two methods of carry-
ing out the original contract. The former contract was
by the terms of the new agreement said to be in force
except Nas herein altered". This alteration of the pro-
vision was held not a law, but a regulation of the
Common Council, and theefore not under the prohibitory
clause of the Constitution of the United States. (anhat-
tan Trust Company v. The City of Dajton, 59 F 'e leral.Re-
porter, 627,)
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CHAPTER VIII.
A NOVEL FEATIUE IN THE NEW YORK STATUTES.
An interesting and novel feature of the power of
the legislature to revoke a corporate franchise lately
occurred in New York State. It is in sabstance this
In 1890 the legislature repealed the clause of Part I,
Ch.18,Title IIISec.8, Revised Statutes, which reads thus,
"The charter of every corporation that shall hereafter
be granted by the legislature, shall be subject to alter-
ation, suspension, an. repeal, in the discretion of the
legislature. This section was repealed upon the sup-
position that substantially the same groumd was covered
by the clause of the New York Constitution of 1846, which
provides that,-- "All general laws and special acts pass-
ed pursuant to this section may be altered from time to
time or repealed'-- (Art. VII, Sec. 1 Const. N. Y.).
The legislature has since found itself in this dif-
ficulty. Those corporations which had received their
charters previous to the adoption of the constitution of
1846 were formed under the statute here repealed, and
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could not therefore be brought within the power of the
constitutional clause. The previous constitution of
1821 contains no word on the subject of corporations ;
so that upon the repeal of the statute, these corpora-
tions were given the rights, powers, and privileges ap-
purtenant to corporations under the old doctrine of the
Dartmouth College case. Their chartes were therefore
irrevocable, unalterable, and perpetual, and are pro-
tected by Art. I, See. 10 of the Constitution of the
United States as contracts, and the state can pass no law
impairing their obligations.
But cannot the' state re-enact ? Is it impossible to
incorporate into the statutes the clause that was re-
pealed ? Here we have another interesting and novel
feature. To do this the state must pass a law that is
to reach back to the time of the repeal, anv, at the same
time not be retro-active as impairing the obligation of
contracts, or disturbing vested rights, It is as if the
State qnd the Corporation had entered into a contract.
After its consurrmnation the State says to the Corporation
"I will relinquish my rights under a certain clause of
our contract. We will therefore strike this clause out
70
of our agreement.' At a l:'ter period, the state seeing
its mistake, comes to the corporation with,-- "I wish to
reinstate into our contract the clause stricken out
some time ago." The corporation, unwilling to relinquish
its power, meets this request with the argunent that it
has acquired vested rights under the charter, and tivre-
for proposes to throw itself on its constitutional
privilege, and set up Article I, Sec. 10 of the United
States Constitution together with the Dartmouth College
case as a defense.
The state is now in a dilermma. If it re-enacts
the law, the corporation sets up its constitutional
rights and privileges. If it does not we have the eor-
poration unrestrained, and it goes on gathering to it-
self dominion and power. There has been no litigation
on the subject, so far as I can find, but a suit on this
feature of the law would be of vital importance and
would revive a dra matic moment in the laws of the cor-
pora te franc hise.
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